

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1033

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USMISSION GENEVA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0276

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

GENEVA FOR CSCE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: AD HOC GROUP REPORT TO NAC ON
THE PHASE II REDUCTION COMMITMENT PROBLEM

THERE FOLLOWS THE TEXT OF AN AD HOC GROUP REPORT TO

NAC ON THE PHASE II REDUCTION COMMITMENT PROBLEM.

THE REPORT WAS APPROVED AT THE JUNE 16 MEETING OF THE

AHG. DELEGATION COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS BEING SENT

BY SEPTEL.

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BEGIN TEXT:

AD HOC GROUP REPORT

1. THE AD HOC GROUP REQUESTS EARLY GUIDANCE FROM THE COUNCIL ON THE QUESTION OF WHAT FURTHER COMMENTS, IF ANY SHOULD BE GIVEN THE EAST AT THIS STAGE AS TO THE NATURE OF THE REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS WHICH WILL BE ASSUMED BY WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE PHASE II AGREEMENT CONTEMPLATED BY THE WEST.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

2. IN THE INFORMAL SESSION OF JUNE 3, 1975, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES ASKED WHETHER, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ALLIED REDUCTION PROGRAM, EACH OF THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD COMMIT ITSELF INDIVIDUALLY IN PHASE II AS TO THE AMOUNT OF ITS REDUCTIONS.

3. IN RESPONSE, ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES INFORMALLY INDICATED THAT, IN THEIR OWN VIEW, SINCE THE WEST WAS NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT ANY NATIONAL CEILINGS, IT WAS EVIDENT THAT THERE COULD NOT BE ANY NATIONAL COMMITMENT IN PHASE II TO REDUCE A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF FORCES. SINCE THE WEST WOULD ACCEPT ONLY A COLLECTIVE COMMON CEILING, THE REDUCTION COMMITMENT OF THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN PHASE II TO REACH THE COMMON CEILING COULD ONLY BE OF COLLECTIVE NATURE.

4. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES STRONGLY CRITICIZED THIS APPROACH. THEY CLAIMED THAT THESE WESTERN STATEMENTS INDICATED THAT, EVEN IN PHASE II, NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD NOT BE PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL REDUCTION COMMITMENTS, AND THAT THIS IN THEIR VIEW REPRESENTED A BACKWARD STEP AND REINFORCED THEIR OBJECTIONS TO THE PHASE APPROACH.

5. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES SAID THAT THE ALLIED RESPONSE HAD RAISED THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER EACH INDIVIDUAL NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANT WOULD IN FACT REDUCE ITS FORCES BY ANY SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT EVEN IN A PHASE II AGREEMENT. THEY COMMENTED THAT THE APPROACH DESCRIBED BY THE ALLIED REPRES-

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ENTATIVES WOULD PERMIT INDIVIDUAL NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, EVEN IF THEY HAD VERY SUBSTANTIAL FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, TO REDUCE BY ONLY A FEW SOLDIERS IN PHASE II. THEY REPEATED THEIR STANDARD REQUIREMENT THAT, IF EASTERN PARTICIPANTS (E.G. THE USSR) WERE TO BE EXPECTED TO UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS, THE EAST HAD TO KNOW WHAT SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL OBLIGATIONS AS TO AMOUNT AND TIMING OF THEIR REDUCTIONS EACH WESTERN PARTICIPANT

WAS WILLING TO UNDERTAKE.

6. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES ALSO STATED THAT THE NATURE OF REDUCTION COMMITMENTS WAS A SEPARATE ISSUE FROM THE NATURE OF RESIDUAL CEILINGS AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF REDUCTIONS, WHETHER NATIONAL CEILINGS AS PROPOSED BY THE EAST OR A COLLECTIVE CEILING AS PROPOSED BY THE WEST.

7. IN THE INFORMAL SESSION OF JUNE 10, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES AGAIN RAISED THE SAME QUESTION, WHETHER, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ALLIED REDUCTION PROGRAM, WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE INDIVIDUAL REDUCTION COMMITMENTS IN PHASE II. ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES RESPONDED THAT THEY HAD EXPLAINED TO EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES THE BASIS AND REASONS FOR THE WESTERN TWO-PHASE APPROACH TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS WAS WHY IT WAS PREMATURE TO GO NOW INTO THE PRECISE DETAILS OF THE NATURE OF PHASE II REDUCTION COMMITMENTS. IN ANY EVENT, THE WEST WOULD BE PREPARED IN PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS TO CONSIDER ONLY THOSE OBLIGATIONS WHICH WERE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE COLLECTIVE COMMON CEILING WHICH ALLIES ENVISAGED. WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES SAID THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO BE MORE SPECIFIC.

8. IN THE JUNE 10 SESSION, WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES ALSO COMMENTED THAT EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAD SUGGESTED IN THE LAST INFORMAL SESSION THAT THE FORMULATION OF REDUCTION COMMITMENTS WOULD NOT NECESSARILY HAVE CONNOTATIONS FOR THE FORMULATION OF COMMITMENTS REGARDING LIMITATIONS ON MANPOWER LEVELS AFTER REDUCTIONS. BUT REDUCTION COMMITMENTS OBVIOUSLY COULD HAVE SUCH CONNOTATIONS, AND THE WEST WOULD IN ANY EVENT WISH TO BE SATISFIED THAT THE MANPOWER LIMITATIONS TO BE SUBSCRIBED TO BY NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE OF A COLLECTIVE NATURE.

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RESULTING TACTICAL SITUATION

9. BY RAISING THE QUESTION OF WHETHER WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WOULD UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL REDUCTION COMMITMENTS IN PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS, THE EAST HAS PUT THE ALLIES IN A TACTICALLY DIFFICULT POSITION AS FAR AS THE PHASING ISSUE IS CONCERNED. THE DIFFICULTY ARISES FROM THE FACT THAT THERE IS NO AGREED ALLIANCE POSITION ON THIS SPECIFIC QUESTION.

10. PRESENT NATO GUIDANCE PROVIDES THAT:

A. THE ALLIES SHOULD SEEK FURTHER REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE SECOND PHASE (PARA 34 OF CM(73)83).

B. THE ALLIANCE WOULD WISH TO BE FREE TO DECIDE FOR ITSELF HOW THE WEIGHT OF THE REDUCTIONS REQUIRED FOR THE SECOND PHASE SHOULD BE DISTRIBUTED AMONG THE NATIONAL FORCES INVOLVED (PARA 34 OF CM(73)83).

C. THE ALLIES SHOULD NOT BECOME INVOLVED IN DISCUSSING DETAILS OF SECOND PHASE REDUCTIONS WITH THE EAST EARLY IN NEGOTIATIONS (PARA 34 OF CM(73)83).

D. SUBSEQUENT TO THE SECOND PHASE, THE OVERALL COMMON CEILING SHOULD BE RESPECTED BY BEACH SIDE WITH NO SUB-CEILING OTHER THAN ON THE US AND SOVIET FORCES WITHIN THE COMMON CEILING (PARA 36 OF CM(73)83).

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USMISSION GENEVA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

GENEVA FOR CSCE

11. UNDER THIS GUIDANCE, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR ALLIED NEGOTIATORS EITHER TO CLARIFY ALLIED INTENTIONS OR TO PROVIDE AGREED CORRECTIONS TO THE INTERPRETATION WHICH THE EAST HAS PUT ON ALLIED STATEMENTS.

12. THE TACTICAL SITUATION OF THE ALLIES WITH REGARD TO PHASING HAS CHANGED AS A RESULT OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS. UP TO NOW, THE EAST HAS NOT ASKED SUCH SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ABOUT THE NATURE OF WESTERN REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS IN PHASE II, AS SUCH, APPARENTLY PREFERRRING TO AVOID SHOWING

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EVEN THIS MUCH INTEREST. THIS IS THE FIRST NEW ELEMENT IN THE SITUATION. THE SECOND IS THE EASTERN ARGUMENT, REPEATED IN THE INFORMAL SESSION OF JUNE 10, THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN COMMITMENTS ON REDUCTIONS FROM COMMITMENTS ON RESIDUAL CEILINGS AND TO TREAT THE TWO ISSUES SEPARATELY.

13. THE EFFECT OF THE FIRST DEVELOPMENT IS THAT FUTURE ALLIED EFFORTS TO ARGUE FOR THE PHASING CONCEPT WILL BE MET BY REPETITIONS OF THE EASTERN QUESTION, NAMELY WHETHER, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ALLIED REDUCTION PROGRAM, EACH OF THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WILL UNDER-TAKE INDIVIDUAL REDUCTION COMMITMENTS IN PHASE II. UNLESS THIS QUESTION IS ANSWERED, THE WEST WILL FIND IT MOST DIFFICULT TO ENGAGE THE EAST IN EFFECTIVE DISCUSSION OF THE WESTERN PHASING CONCEPT. THE EAST MAY ALSO SEE POSSIBILITIES OF EXPLOITING THIS ISSUE IN IT SPUBLIC STANCE. THIS IS NOT TO SUGGEST IN ANY WAY THAT A WESTERN ANSWER WILL OF ITSELF BRING EASTERN AGREEMENT TO PHASING.

14. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SECOND DEVELOPMENT NEED TO BE EXAMINED CAREFULLY. IN ANY EVENT, THE WEST COULD NOT AGREE TO DEAL WITH THE ISSUE OF PHASE II REDUCTION COMMITMENTS PRIOR TO AND INDEPENDENT OF THE ISSUE OF THE COLLECTIVE NATURE OF THE COMMON CEILING.

POSSIBLE ALLIED ACTION:

15. THE ALLIES ARE THEREFORE FACED WITH THE CHOICE BETWEEN (1) LEAVING THE WESTERN POSITION AS IT WAS EXPLAINED TO THE EAST ON 10 JUNE (PARAGRAPHS 7 AND 8 ABOVE) WITH THE IMPLICATIONS INDICATED IN PARAGRAPH 13; AND (2) AMPLIFYING THAT POSITION.

16. IF THE ALLIES DECIDE TO ADOPT THE LATTER COURSE,
THERE APPEAR TO BE A NUMBER OF POSSIBILITIES FOR FILLING
THE PRESENT GAP IN THE ALLIED POSITION. SOME EXAMPLES ARE:

A. ALL THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS COULD UNDERTAKE
A COLLECTIVE COMMITMENT IN A PHASE II AGREEMENT TO REDUCE
A SPECIFIC TOTAL OF THEIR COLLECTIVE MANPOWER TO THE AGREED

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COMMON CEILING LEVEL. THEY COULD INFORM THE EAST AFTER
ENTRY INTO EFFECT OF A PHASE II AGREEMENT OF THE DISTRI-
BUTION OF THIS TOTAL AMONG INDIVIDUAL WESTERN DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS.

B. THE ALLIES COULD DECLINE TO DISCUSS THE NATURE
OF PHASE II REDUCTION COMMITMENTS AT THIS STAGE. THEY
COULD HOWEVER SAY THAT, PROVIDED THAT THE EAST AGREED TO
A COLLECTIVE COMMON CEILING, STATEMENTS COULD BE MADE PRIOR
TO SIGNATURE OF A PHASE II AGREEMENT GIVING EACH SIDE
INFORMATION AS TO HOW THE OTHER INTENDS TO DISTRIBUTE
ITS TOTAL REDUCTION.

C. PROVIDED THAT THE EAST AGREED TO A COLLECTIVE
COMMON CEILING, THE INDIVIDUAL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON
BOTH SIDES COULD UNDERTAKE INDIVIDUAL NUMERICAL REDUCTION
OBLIGATIONS IN PHASE II.

END TEXT.RESOR

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